The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
Through these things therefore Parmenides defines the second order
of intelligibles to be a wholeness. For as existence is derived to
all things from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an
all-perfect division from the third. This however will be considered
by us hereafter. Wholeness therefore is triple, being either prior to
parts, or consisting of parts, or subsisting in a part, according to
the doctrine of Plato. For in the Politicus indeed, he calls genus
a whole, but species a part, not that genus derives its completion
from species, but exists prior to it. And in the Timæus he says that
the world is a whole of wholes. And all the world indeed derives its
completion from parts that are wholes; but each of the parts is a
whole, not as the universe is, but partially. Wholeness therefore,
being triple as we have said, according to Plato, the unity, and the
intelligible and occult cause of these is now delivered, unically
comprehending and constituting three wholenesses; according to the
hyparxis indeed of itself, the wholeness prior to parts; but according
to its power, the wholeness which is from parts; and according to its
being the wholeness which is in a part. For _the one_ is prior to
all multitude; but power communicates in a certain respect with both
the extremes, and comprehends in itself the peculiarities of them; and
being in a certain respect participates of _the one_. Hence the
first of the wholenesses, or that which is prior to parts is derived
from a unical hyparxis. For it is a monad, and is itself constitutive
of parts, and of the multitude which is in them. But the second
wholeness is from power. For it derives its completion from parts, just
as in the power which is collective of the one and being, the extremes
in a certain respect shine forth to the view. And the third wholeness
is from being. For being is a part, and is the progeny both of power
and _the one_,[203] and possesses each of these partially. After
the intelligible therefore, three wholenesses are divided according
to the different orders of beings. But the intelligible wholeness
comprehends the three unically, and is the intelligibly connective
monad of this triad, every way extending the powers of itself from the
middle of the intelligible and occult order.
CHAPTER XXVI.