The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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therefore, is through these things unfolded to us by Parmenides.
CHAPTER XXV.
But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression,
which Parmenides characterizes by intelligible wholeness, as we
have shown in the Sophista. For the first triad being uniform, and
possessing all things intelligibly and occultly, viz. hyparxis, power
and being, so that power which is the cause of division, subsisting
between _the one_ and being, is concealed, and becomes apparent
through the communion of the extremes with each other,--the second
triad proceeds, being characterized by the first intelligible power,
and having the monads in itself distinguished from each other. For
all things being united and without distinction in the first triad,
distinction and separation shine forth in this triad. Being also and
power are more divided from each other. And that which consists of
these is no longer one being [or being characterized by _the one_,] but
is a whole, so that it has _the one_ and being in itself as parts. For
above indeed [i.e. in the first triad] all things are prior to parts
and wholeness. But in this triad there are both parts and a whole,
power unfolding itself into light. For as there is separation here,
there are parts and the whole consisting of these. The second triad
therefore is called intelligible wholeness. But the parts of it, _the
one_ and being, I call the extremes. And power being here the middle,
connects _the one_ and being, and does not cause them to be one, in
the same manner as in the first triad. Since also it is the middle of
both, through its communion indeed with being, it renders _the one_ one
being; but through its communion with _the one_, it perfectly causes
being to be one. And thus the one being consists of two parts, viz. of
being which is characterised by _the one_, and of _the one_ which is
characterized by being, as Parmenides himself says. He begins therefore
to speak about this triad as follows: “Again therefore, let us say if
_the one_ is what will happen. Consider then if it is not necessary
that this hypothesis should signify _the one_ to be a thing of such a
kind as to have parts?” But he ends in the following words: “That which
is one therefore is a whole, and has a part.”