The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
Who, therefore, so clearly reminds us of eternal animal, and the
primogenial triad, as Parmenides, first assuming in this order
generation and the ever, and so continually using each of these? The
same thing, therefore, is both an all-perfect animal, and all-powerful
intelligible multitude. For the first infinity being power, and every
intelligible subsisting according to it, and receiving from it a
division into parts, I think it proper to call it all-powerful; thus
avoiding the appellation of the infinite, which disturbs the multitude.
That, however, which in these things is both difficult to understand,
and for which Plato especially deserves to be admired, we must not
omit, but demonstrate to the genuine lovers of truth. For intelligible
animal comprehends four intelligible ideas, according to which it not
only constitutes the genera of Gods, but also the more excellent kind
of beings after the Gods, and also mortal animals themselves; for
generating it extends the idea of air-wandering, the idea of aquatic,
and the idea of terrestrial animals, from the Gods as far as to mortal
animals. Since animal itself, therefore, comprehends four ideas,
and through the same paradigms produces totally divine, dæmoniacal
and mortal animals, this deservedly produces a doubt in those who
love the contemplation of truth, how, the causes being the same, and
the same primary paradigms preexisting, some of the natures which
are constituted are Gods, others dæmons, and others mortal animals.
For all these being generated with reference to one form, how is it
possible they should not have the same form and nature; since it is
requisite that one idea should every where be generative of things
that have a similar form? For on this account we admit the hypothesis
of ideas, in order that the intelligible genus of Gods may possess
and contain prior to multitude monads productive of similar natures.
This doubt,[205] therefore, being so difficult, some one may solve it
logically by saying, that all things which subsist according to one
form are not synonimous, and that they do not similarly participate of
their common cause, but some things primarily, and others ultimately.
For each form is the leader of a certain series, beginning supernally,
and subsiding as far as to the last of things. For according to
the oracle, all things begin supernally to extend their admirable
rays to the downward place. Hence it will not be wonderful that the
same idea should pre-exist as the cause of Gods, dæmons, and mortal
animals, producing all things totally, and delivering the more partial
separation of things to the demiurgic order, in the same manner as
this order delivers the production of individuals to the junior Gods.
For intelligibles are the causes of whole series; but intellectuals
of divisions according to common genera. Supermundane forms are the
causes of specific differences; but mundane of things which are now
individuals.