The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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Moreover, in the Timæus, Plato calls the third triad of intelligibles,
animal itself, intelligible, all-perfect, and only-begotten. But in
the Parmenides he denominates it infinite multitude, and a wholeness
comprehensive of many parts. And in the Sophista he perpetually calls
it the intelligible distributed into many beings. All these assertions,
therefore, are the progeny of one science, and tend to one intelligible
truth. For when Timæus calls this triad intelligible animal, he also
asserts it to be all-perfect, and comprehensive of intelligible
animals as its parts, both according to one and according to parts.
Hence animal itself is according to this a whole, comprehensive of
intelligible animals as its parts. And Parmenides, when he shows
that the one being is all-perfect multitude, demonstrates that it is
consubsistent with this order. For the infinite will be all-powerful
and all-perfect, as we have before observed, comprehending in itself
an intelligible multitude of parts, which also it generates; some of
these being more total, but others more partial, and as Timæus says,
both according to one, and according to genera. Farther still, as he
calls animal itself eternal and only-begotten, so Parmenides first
attributes the ever and to be generated, to infinite multitude, when
he says, “And thus, according to the same reasoning, whatever part is
generated will always possess these two parts: for _the one_ will
always contain being, and being _the one_; so that two things will
necessarily always be generated, and no part will ever be one.”