The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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Let us now therefore again follow Parmenides in another way, who
after the intelligible triads generates the intelligible, and at
the same time, intellectual orders, and unfolds the continued
progression of divine natures, through successive conclusions. For
the connexion of the words, and their dependence on each other,
imitates the indissoluble order of things, which always conjoins
middles to extremes, and proceeds through middle genera to the last
progressions of beings. This therefore we must survey prior to the
several intellectual conceptions, how the intelligible, and at the
same time, intellectual triads, proceed analogous to the intelligible
triads, that we may comprehend by a reasoning process the well-arranged
order of things. There were three intelligible triads therefore, viz.
the one being, whole, and infinite multitude. And three intelligible,
and at the same time, intellectual triads, have also presented
themselves to our view, viz. number, whole, and the perfect. Hence
from the one being, number is derived; from the intelligible whole,
the whole that is in these; and from infinite multitude, the perfect.
For the infinite which is there was all-powerful, and all-perfect,
comprehending indeed all things, but being itself incomprehensible. To
the all-powerful therefore and all-perfect, the perfect is analogous,
possessing a perfection which is intellectual, and secondary to the
first effective and intelligible perfection. The whole also which
is both intelligible and intellectual is allied to the intelligible
whole, but it differs from it, so far as the latter possesses wholeness
according to the one union of the one being; but _the one_ of the
former appears to be itself by itself a whole, consisting of unical
parts; and being appears to consist of many beings. These wholenesses
therefore, being divided, differ from the wholeness which precedes
according to union and is intelligible. For the wholenesses of this
whole are parts of the intelligible wholeness.