The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
In the third place therefore, we must consider number as analogous
to the one being. For the one being is there indeed occultly,
intelligibly, and paternally; but here in conjunction with difference
it generates number, which constitutes the separation of forms and
reasons.[235] For difference itself first shines forth in this order,
being power indeed, and the duad in intelligibles; but here it is
maternal, and a prolific fountain. For there power was collective of
_the one_, and the one being; on which account also it was ineffable,
as existing occultly in _the one_ and in hyparxis. But here difference
separates indeed being and _the one_. After this likewise, it
multiplies _the one_ proceeding generatively, and calls forth being
into second and third progressions; breaking indeed being into many
beings, and dividing _the one_ into more partial unities. But according
to each of these completing the decrements, the wholes remaining. Very
properly therefore does Plato make the negations of _the one_ from
this. For here the many subsist, through difference which divides being
and _the one_; since the whole also which is denied of _the one_, is
intellectual and not intelligible. The negation therefore says that
_the one_ is not a whole, so that the affirmation is, _the one_ is
a whole. This whole however is intellectual and not intelligible.
Parmenides also denies the many as follows: “_The one_ is not many;”
but the opposite to this is, _the one_ is many. The multitude of
intelligibles, however, does not make _the one_ to be many, but
causes the one being to be many. And in short, every intelligible is
characterized by the one being. For in the intelligible being and _the
one_ are complicated, and are connascent with each other; and being is
most unical. But when each of these proceeds into multitude, they are
separated from each other, and evince a greater difference with respect
to each other. Each of these also is divided into multitude through
the prolific nature of difference. From these things therefore, it is
evident that the intelligible and intellectual orders, being analogous
to the intelligible orders, proceed in conjunction with diminution.
CHAPTER XXVIII.