The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
Plato · en
The nature of number, therefore, pervades from on high, as far as
to the last of things, adorning all things, and connecting them by
appropriate forms. For how could a perfect number comprehend the period
of the whole world, as the Muses in Plato assert that it does? Or how
could numbers, some of which are productive of fertility, and others
of sterility, comprehend the descents of souls? Or how could some
of them define the ascents of souls in less, but others in greater
periods, as Socrates says in the Phædrus, where he delivers to us
restitutions consisting of three thousand and ten thousand years? Or
how could time itself which is unically comprehensive of the psychical
measures, proceed according to number, as Timæus says it does, unless
divine number exists prior to all these, which imparts to all things
a principal cause of order according to numbers? Since all things
therefore subsist through numbers and forms, numbers are allotted
a progression from the intellectual summit. But forms have their
generation from intelligible[240] forms. For forms subsist primarily
in the third triad of intelligibles. But numbers are primarily in the
first triad of intellectuals; since also in the effects of these, every
number indeed is form, but not every form is number.
If, however, it be requisite clearly to unfold the truth, numbers are
also prior to forms. For there are indeed superessential numbers, but
there are not superessential forms. And according to this reasoning
every form is number, as also the Pythagoreans said. For Timæus being
a Pythagorean, not only asserts that there are intelligible forms, but
also intelligible numbers; for he says that the intelligible forms are
four. There however, number is intelligibly, and monadically according
to cause. For intelligible animal is a monad, occultly containing the
whole of number. But in the summit of intellectuals, number subsists
separately, evolving the number which preexists in the monad according
to cause and uniformly. For there is a difference, I think, between
saying multitude in its cause, and multitude from its cause, and
between saying united, and saying separated multitude. And the one
indeed is prior to number, but the other is number. So that according
to Timæus there are intelligible numbers together with forms, and prior
to forms. And according to Parmenides, number is after multitude. For
Timæus calls uniform and occult multitude the number of forms. But
since number is primarily in the Gods, but forms participate of the
divine unities, he denominates the first ideas four. For monad and
triad, were primarily indeed in the Gods themselves, but secondarily in
intellectuals; and superessentially indeed in the former, but formally
in the latter. In intelligibles therefore, multitude was unically; but
in intellectuals it subsists separately. But where there is separation
there also there is number, as we have frequently observed. Hence