The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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CHAPTER III.
All, therefore, that have ever touched upon theology, have called
things first, according to nature, Gods; and have said that the
theological science is conversant about these. And some, indeed, have
considered a corporeal essence, as that alone which has any existence,
and have placed in a secondary rank with respect to essence, all the
genera of incorporeal natures, considering the principles of things as
having a corporeal form, and evincing that the habit in us by which we
know these, is corporeal. But others, suspending indeed all bodies from
incorporeal natures, and defining the first hyparxis[86] to be in soul,
and the powers of soul, call (as it appears to me) the best of souls,
Gods; and denominate the science which proceeds as far as to these, and
which knows these, theology. But such as produce the multitude of souls
from another more ancient principle, and establish intellect as the
leader of wholes, these assert that the best end is a union of the soul
with intellect, and consider the intellectual form of life as the most
honourable of all things. They doubtless too consider theology, and
the discussion of intellectual essence, as one and the same. All these,
therefore, as I have said, call the first and most self-sufficient
principles of things, Gods, and the science respecting these, theology.
The divine narration however, of Plato alone, despises all corporeal
natures, with reference to principles. Because, indeed, every thing
divisible and endued with interval, is naturally unable either to
produce or preserve itself, but possesses its being, energy, and
passivity through soul, and the motions which soul contains. But Plato
demonstrates that the psychical essence [i.e. the essence pertaining
to soul] is more ancient than bodies, but is suspended from an
intellectual hypostasis. For every thing which is moved according to
time, though it may be self-moved, is indeed of a more ruling nature
than things moved by others, but is posterior to an eternal motion.
He shows, therefore, as we have said, that intellect is the father
and cause of bodies and souls, and that all things both subsist
and energize about it, which are allotted a life conversant with
transitions and evolutions.