The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 1 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning
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But he teaches us that the theory respecting intellect, and the
forms and the genera revolving about intellect, is posterior to the
science which is conversant with the Gods themselves. Likewise that
the intellectual theory apprehends intelligibles, and the forms
which are capable of being known by the soul through the projecting
energy of intellect; but that the theological science transcending
this, is conversant with arcane and ineffable hyparxes, and pursues
their separation from each other, and their unfolding into light from
one cause of all: whence, I am of opinion, that the intellectual
peculiarity of the soul is capable of apprehending intellectual forms,
and the difference which subsists in them, but that the summit, and,
as they say, flower of intellect and hyparxis, is conjoined with the
unities of beings, and through these, with the occult union of all
the divine unities. For as we contain many gnostic powers, through
this alone we are naturally capable of being conjoined with and
participating this occult union. For the genus of the Gods cannot be
apprehended by sense, because it is exempt from all bodies; nor by
opinion and dianoia,[89] for these are divisible and come into contact
with multiform concerns; nor by intelligence in conjunction with
reason, for knowledge of this kind belongs to true beings; but the
hyparxis of the Gods rides on beings, and is defined according to the
union itself of wholes. It remains, therefore, if it be admitted that a
divine nature can be in any respect known, that it must be apprehended
by the hyparxis of the soul, and through this, as far as it is
possible, be known. For we say that every where things similar can be
known by the similar; viz. the sensible by sense, the doxastic[90] by
opinion, the dianoetic by dianoia, and the intelligible by intellect.
So that the most unical nature must be known by _the one_, and the
ineffable by that which is ineffable.