Hence, every thing which is bound is dissoluble. But one thing is thus dissoluble and indissoluble, and another is dissoluble only, just as the intelligible is alone indissoluble. Why, therefore, is that which is primarily bound at one and the same time dissoluble and indissoluble? Because it is _beautifully_ harmonized, and is _well_ composed. For from being _well_ composed it obtains union; since _goodness_ is unific. But from the intelligible it obtains the _beautifully_; for from thence beauty is derived. And from fabricating power it obtains _harmony_; for this is the cause of the Muses, and is the source of harmonical arrangement to mundane natures. Hence we again have the three causes, the final through the _well_, the paradigmatic through the _beautifully_; and the demiurgic through the _harmonized_.[79] But it is necessary that a composition of this kind, harmonized by the one fabricating power, filled with divine beauty, and obtaining a boniform union, should be indissoluble; for the demiurgus says, that to dissolve it is the province of an evil nature. Moreover, prior to this Plato had said, that the universe is indissoluble except by him by whom it was bound. If, however, it is entirely impossible for the universe to be dissolved by any other, but the father alone is able to dissolve it, and it is impossible for him to effect this, for it is the province of an evil nature,--it is impossible for the universe to be dissolved. For either he must dissolve it, or some other. But if some other, who is it that is able to offer violence to the demiurgus? For it is impossible that a dissolution of it should be effected, except by him that bound it. But if he dissolves it, how being good, can he dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized and well composed. For that which is subversive of these, is productive of evil; just as that which is subversive of evil is allotted a beneficent nature. Hence, there is an equal necessity that the demiurgus should be depraved, if it be lawful so to speak, or that this world should be dissolved, [viz. each of these is equally impossible.] Such, therefore, is the necessity which Plato assigns to the incorruptibility of the universe. Hence, that Plato gives the indissoluble to the composition of the mundane Gods, he clearly manifests when he orders them to bind mortal natures, not with those indissoluble bonds with which they are connected. For if the connective bonds of these Gods are indissoluble, they themselves must be essentially indissoluble. Here, however, he says that they are not in every respect indissoluble. It is evident, therefore, from both these assertions, that they are indissoluble, and at the same time dissoluble,[80] and that they are not in every respect indissoluble, in consequence of their being appropriately bound. But if these things are true, there is every necessity that the dissolution of them should be very different from that which we call corruption. For that