different, _have been_ from that which _was_, and _will be_ from that which _is to be hereafter_. But from that which is _becoming to be_ different, it ought neither to _have been_, nor to _be hereafter_, nor _to be_, but to subsist in _becoming to be_ different, and no otherwise. It is necessary. But the older differs from the younger, and no other. Certainly. Hence, that which is _becoming to be_ older than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in _becoming to be_ younger than itself. It seems so. But likewise it ought not to subsist in _becoming to be_ in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in _becoming to be_, should _be_, _have been_, and _be hereafter_. For these are necessary. It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming to be both older and younger than itself. It seems so. But no one of these passions belongs to _the one_. None. Neither, therefore, is time present with it, nor does it subsist in any time. It does not indeed according to the decisions of reason.” Plato having proceeded, says Proclus, as far as to the mundane Gods, always taking away things in a consequent order from _the one_, through the middle genera, or, to speak more clearly, the negations always producing things secondary, through such as are proximate to _the one_, from the exempt cause of wholes, he is now about to separate from _the one_ the divine essence itself, which first participates of the Gods, and receives their progression into the world; or, to speak more accurately, he is now about to produce this essence from the ineffable fountain of all beings. For, as every thing which has being derives its subsistence from the monad of beings, both _true being_, and that which is assimilated to it, which of itself indeed is not, but through its communion with true being receives an obscure representation of being; in like manner from the one unity of every deity, the peculiarity of which, if it be lawful so to speak, is to deify all things according to a certain exempt and ineffable transcendency, every divine number subsists, or rather proceeds, and every deified order of things. The design, therefore, as we have before observed, of what is now said, is to show that _the one_ is exempt from, and therefore produces this essence.