The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
And here we may see how Parmenides subverts their hypothesis who
contend that the first cause is soul, or any thing else of this kind,
and this by showing that _the one_ does not participate of time. For
it is impossible that a nature which is exempt from time should be
soul; since every soul participates of time, and uses periods which
are measured by time. _The one_ also is better than, and is beyond
intellect, because every intellect is both moved and permanent;
but it is demonstrated that _the one_ neither stands still, nor is
moved. Hence through these things, the three hypostases which rank
as principles, viz. _the one_, _intellect_, and _soul_, become known
to us. But that _the one_ is perfectly exempt from time, Parmenides
demonstrates by showing in the first place, that it is neither older
nor younger, nor of the same age with itself, nor with any other. For
every thing which participates of time necessarily participates of
these; so that by showing that _the one_ is exempt from these which
happen to every thing that participates of time, he also shows that
_the one_ has no connexion with time. This, however, is incredible to
the many, and appeared so to the physiologists prior to Plato, who
thought that all things were comprehended in time, and that, if there
is any thing perpetual, it is infinite time, but that there is not any
thing which time does not measure. For, as they were of opinion that
all things are in place, in consequence of thinking that all things
are bodies, and that nothing is incorporeal, so they thought that
all things subsist in time, and are in motion, and that nothing is
immoveable; for the conception of bodies introduces with itself place,
but motion time. As, therefore, it was demonstrated that _the one_ is
not in place, because it is not in another, and on this account is
incorporeal,--in like manner through these arguments it is also shown
that neither is it in time, and on this account that it is not soul,
nor any thing else which requires and participates of time, either
according to essence or according to energy.