The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
This also is evident from Plato in the Timæus, where he says that
intellect has in us the relation of a dæmon. But this is only true
as far as pertains to analogy. For a dæmon according to essence is
different from a dæmon according to analogy. For in many instances,
that which proximately presides, subsisting in the order of a dæmon
with respect to that which is inferior, is called a dæmon. Thus Jupiter
in Orpheus calls his father Saturn an illustrious dæmon; and Plato in
the Timæus calls those Gods who proximately preside over, and orderly
distribute the realms of generation, dæmons. “For,” says he, “to speak
concerning other dæmons, and to know their generation, exceeds the
ability of human nature.” But a dæmon according to analogy is that
which proximately presides over any thing, though it should be a God,
or though it should be some one of the natures posterior to the Gods.
And the soul that through similitude to the dæmoniacal genus produces
energies more wonderful than those which belong to human nature, and
which suspends the whole of its life from dæmons, is a dæmon κατα
σχεσιν, according to habitude, i.e. proximity or alliance. Thus, as it
appears to me, Socrates in the Republic calls those dæmons, who have
lived well, and who in consequence of this are transferred to a better
condition of being, and to more holy places. But an essential dæmon
is neither called a dæmon through habitude to secondary natures, nor
through an assimilation to something different from itself; but is
allotted this peculiarity from himself, and is defined by a certain
hyparxis, by appropriate powers, and by different modes of energies.
In short, the rational soul is called in the Timæus the dæmon of the
animal; but we investigate the dæmon of man, and not of the animal;
that which governs the rational soul itself, and not its instrument;
and that which leads the soul to its judges, after the dissolution of
the animal, as Socrates says in the Phædo. For when the animal is no
more, the dæmon which the soul was allotted while connected with the
body, conducts it to its judge. For, if the soul possesses that dæmon
while living in the body, which is said to lead it to judgment after
death, this dæmon must be the dæmon of the man, and not of the animal
alone. To which we may add, that beginning from on high, it governs the
whole of our composition.