The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
In the first place, we must say that Socrates, through his dianoëtic
power, and his science of things, enjoyed the inspiration of his dæmon,
who continually recalled him to divine love. In the second place, in
the affairs of life, Socrates supernally directed his providential
attention to more imperfect souls. And according to the energy of
his dæmon, he received the light proceeding from thence, neither in
his dianoëtic part alone, nor in his doxastic powers, but also in
his spirit, the illumination of the dæmon suddenly diffusing itself
through the whole of his life, and now moving sense itself. For it is
evident that reason, imagination, and sense, enjoy the same energy
differently; and that each of our inward parts is passive to, and is
moved by the dæmon in a peculiar manner. The voice therefore, did
not act upon Socrates externally with passivity; but the dæmoniacal
inspiration, proceeding inwardly through his whole soul, and diffusing
itself as far as to the organs of sense, became at last a voice, which
was rather recognized by consciousness than by sense. For such are the
illuminations of good dæmons and the Gods.
In the third place, let us consider the peculiarity of the dæmon of
Socrates; for it never exhorted, bet perpetually recalled him. This
also must be again referred to the Socratic life. For it is not a
property common to our allotted dæmons, but was the characteristic of
the guardian of Socrates. We must say therefore, that the beneficent
and philanthropic disposition of Socrates, and his great promptitude
with respect to the communication of good, did not require the
exhortation of the dæmon. For he was impelled from himself, and was
ready at all times to impart to all men the most excellent life. But
since many of those that came to him were unadapted to the pursuit
of virtue and the science of wholes, his governing good dæmon
restrained him from a providential care of such as these. Just as a
good charioteer alone restrains the impetus of a horse naturally
well adapted for the race, but does not stimulate him, in consequence
of his being excited to motion from himself, and not requiring the
spur, but the bridle. And hence Socrates, from his great readiness
to benefit those with whom he conversed, rather required a recalling
than an exciting dæmon. For the inaptitude of auditors, which is for
the most part concealed from human sagacity, requires a dæmoniacal
discrimination; and the knowledge of favourable opportunities can by
this alone be accurately announced to us. Socrates therefore being
naturally impelled to good, alone required to be recalled in his
unseasonable impulses.