The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
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The triple genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, and
which have been unfolded in the preceding chapters, are indicated
by the following division of time, in the first hypothesis of the
Parmenides; from which division _the one_ is shown to be exempt:
“Do not the terms _it was_, _it has been_, _it did become_, seem to
signify the participation of the time past? Certainly. And do not
the terms _it will be_, _it may become_, and _it will be generated_,
signify that which is about to be hereafter? Certainly. But are not
the terms _it is_, and _it is becoming to be_, marks of the present
time? Entirely so. If then _the one_ participates in no respect of any
time, it neither ever _was_, nor _has been_, nor _did become_. Nor is
it _now generated_, nor is _becoming to be_, nor _is_, nor _may become_
hereafter, nor _will be generated_, nor _will be_. It is most true.”
The commentary of Proclus on this passage is as follows: “This division
of time accords with the multitude of the divine genera, which are
suspended from divine souls, viz. with angels, dæmons, and heroes.
And in the first place, this division proceeds to them supernally,
according to a triadic distribution into the _present_, _past_, and
_future_; and in the next place, according to a distribution into nine,
each of these three being again subdivided into three. For the monad
of souls is united to the one whole of time, but this is participated
secondarily by the multitude of souls. And of this multitude, those
participate of this whole _totally_, that subsist according to _the
past_, or _the present_, or _the future_; but those participate of
it _partially_, that are essentialized according to the differences
of these. For to each of the wholes a multitude is co-ordinated,
divided into things first, middle, and last. For a certain multitude
subsists in conjunction with that which is established conformably to
_the past_, the _summit_ of which is according to _the was_, but the
_middle_ according to _it has been_, and the _end_ according to _it
did become_. With that also which is established according to _the
present_, there is another multitude, the _principal_ part of which is
characterized by _the is_, the _middle_ by _it is generated_, and the
_end_ by _it is becoming to be_. And there is another triad with that
which subsists according to _the future_, the _most elevated_ part
of which is characterized by _the will be_, that which ranks in the
_middle_ by _it may become_, and the _end_ by _it will be generated_.
And thus there will be three triads proximately suspended from these
three totalities, but all these are suspended from their monad.