The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
himself, to that with which he is furnished, and to his own proper
measure. For those that live in solitary places, are the saviours of
themselves, so far as respects human causes. The universe therefore is
likewise after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to itself, and
preserving itself, not through a diminution, but from an exuberance
of power; for self-sufficiency is here indicated; and as he says,
through virtue. For he alone among partial animals [such as we are] who
possesses virtue is able to associate with, and love himself with a
parental affection. But the vicious man looking to his inward baseness,
is indignant with himself and with his own essence, is astonished with
externals, and pursues an association with others, in consequence
of his inability to behold himself. On the contrary, the worthy man
perceiving himself beautiful rejoices and is delighted, and producing
in himself beautiful conceptions, gladly embraces an association
with himself. For we are naturally domesticated to the beautiful,
but hastily withdraw ourselves from deformity. Hence, if the world
possesses virtue adapted to itself, in its intellectual and psychical
essence, and in the perfection of its animal nature, looking to itself,
it loves itself, and is present with, and sufficient to itself.
It is proper therefore to assert these things to those who place
intelligibles external to intellect. For how can that which tends to
other things, and as being deficient is indigent of externals, be
blessed? Hence, if the world is through virtue converted to itself,
must not intellect do this in a much greater degree? Intellect
therefore intellectually perceives itself. And this is among the number
of things immediately known. This also deserves to be remarked, that
Plato when he gives animation to the world, directly imparts virtue to
it. For the participation of soul is immediately accompanied with the
fulness of virtue, in the being which subsists according to nature;
since the one cause of the virtues,[197] is also co-arranged with
the fountain of souls,[198] and the progression of this fountain is
conjoined with the progression of soul. For with respect to virtue,
one indeed is unical, primary and all-perfect; but another subsists
in the ruling supermundane Gods; another in the liberated Gods; and
another is mundane, through which the whole world possesses undefiled
intelligence, an undeviating life, an energy converted to itself,
and a purity unmingled with the animals which it contains. From this
virtue therefore, the world becomes known and friendly to itself. For
knowledge precedes familiarity.