The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
But if multitude subsists simultaneously with _the one_, and they
are naturally co-ordinate with each other; for nothing of time will
prevent them being so; neither will _the one_ of itself be many, nor
will multitude be one, as being at one and the same time oppositely
divided by nature, if neither is prior or posterior to the other.
Hence, multitude of itself will not be one, and each of the things
that are in it will not be one, and this will be the case to infinity,
which is impossible. Multitude, therefore, according to its own nature,
participates of _the one_, and it will not be possible to assume any
thing of it which is not one. For not being one, it will be an infinite
consisting of infinites, as has been demonstrated. Hence, it entirely
participates of _the one_. If, therefore, _the one_ which is of itself
one, in no respect participates of multitude, multitude will be
entirely posterior to _the one_; participating indeed of _the one_, but
not being participated by _the one_.
But if _the one_ also participates of multitude, subsisting indeed as
one according to hyparxis, but as not one, according to participation,
_the one_ will be multiplied, just as multitude is united on account of
_the one_. _The one_, therefore, will communicate with multitude, and
multitude with _the one_. But things which coalesce, and communicate
in a certain respect with each other, if indeed they are collected
together by something else, that something else is prior to them. But
if they themselves collect themselves, they are not opposed to each
other. For opposites do not hasten to each other. Hence, if _the one_
and multitude are oppositely divided, and multitude so far as multitude
is not one, and _the one_ so far as one is not multitude, neither will
one of these subsisting in the other be one and at the same time two.
If, also, there is something prior to them which collects them, this
will either be one, or not one. But if it is not one, it will either be
many or nothing. It will not however be many, lest multitude should
be prior to _the one_, nor yet will it be nothing. For how can nothing
congregate? It is, therefore, one alone. For this which is the one
cannot be many, lest there should be a progression to infinity. It is,
therefore, _the one itself_, and all multitude is from _the one itself_.
PROPOSITION VI.
_Concerning Unity._
Every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.
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