The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For that each of things many will not be itself multitude alone, and
again that each part of this will not be multitude alone is evident.
But if it is not multitude alone, it is either united, or unities
(εναδες). And if, indeed, it participates of _the one_ it is united;
but if it consists of things of which that which is primarily united
consists, it will be unities. For if there is _the one itself_, there
is also that which primarily participates of it, and which is primarily
united. But this consists of unities. For if it consists of things
united, again things united consist of certain things, and this will be
the case to infinity. It is necessary, however, that what is primarily
united should consist of unities. And thus we have discovered what we
proposed at first, [viz. that every multitude consists either of things
united, or of unities.]
PROPOSITION VII.
_Concerning producing causes and things produced._
Every thing productive of another is more excellent than the nature of
the thing produced.
* * * * *
For it is either more excellent, or less excellent, or equal. Hence,
that which is produced from this, will either also itself possess a
power productive of something else, or it will be entirely unprolific.
But if it is unprolific, according to this very thing it will be
inferior to that by which it was produced. And through its inefficacy
it is unequal to its cause which is prolific, and has the power of
producing. But if it also is productive of other things, it either
likewise produces that which is equal to itself, and this in a similar
manner in all things, and all beings will be equal to each other, and
no one thing will be better than another, that which produces, always
giving subsistence in a consequent series to that which is equal to
itself; or it produces that which is unequal to itself, and thus that
which is produced, will no longer be equal to that which produces it.
For it is the province of equal powers to produce equal things. The
progeny of these, however, will be unequal to each other, if that which
produces indeed, is equal to the cause prior to itself, but the thing
posterior to it is unequal to it. Hence, it is not proper that the
thing produced should be equal to its producing cause.