The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
Again however, soul which is moved from itself, has an order secondary
to the immoveable nature, which subsists immoveable according to
energy. Because of all the natures that are moved, the self-moveable
essence is the leader; but of all that move, the immoveable is the
leader. If therefore soul being moved from itself, moves other things,
it is necessary that prior to it, there should be that which moves
immoveably. But intellect moves being immoveable, and energizing
always with an invariable sameness of subsistence. For soul on account
of intellect participates of perpetual intellectual energy, just as
body on account of soul possesses the power of moving itself. For if
perpetual intellection was primarily in soul, it would be inherent
in all souls, in the same manner as the self-motive power. Hence,
perpetual intellection is not primarily in soul. It is necessary
therefore, that prior to it, there should be that which is primarily
intellective. And hence, intellect is prior to souls.
Moreover, _the one_ is prior to intellect. For intellect though it
is immoveable yet is not _the one_; for it intellectually perceives
itself, and energizes about itself. And of _the one_ indeed, all
beings in whatever way they may exist, participate; but all beings
do not participate of intellect. For those beings to whom intellect
is present by participation, necessarily participate of knowledge;
because intellectual knowledge is the principle and first cause of the
gnostic energy. _The one_ therefore, is beyond intellect; and there
is no longer any thing else beyond _the one_. For _the one_ and _the
good_ are the same. But _the good_, as has been demonstrated, is the
principle of all things.
PROPOSITION XXI.
_That intellect is not the first cause._
Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude
co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred
to one monad.
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