The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For if every progression is effected, while primary natures remain
permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being
constituted prior to dissimilars,--if this be the case, that which is
produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For
that which entirely proceeds, will have nothing which is the same with
the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separated from it, and will
not have any thing common with and united to it. Hence it will abide
in its cause, in the same manner as that also abides in itself. If,
however, it abides, but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ
from its cause, nor will it, while that abides, be generated something
different from it. For if it is something different it is separated and
apart from its cause. If, however, it is apart, but the cause abides,
it will proceed from the cause, in order that while it abides, it may
be separated from it. So far therefore, as that which is produced has
something which is the same with the producing[225] cause, it abides
in it; but so far as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being,
however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and
different. Hence, it abides, and at the same time proceeds, and it is
neither of these without the other.
PROPOSITION XXXI.
Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing essentially, is
converted to that from which it proceeds.
* * * * *
For if it should proceed indeed, but should not return to the cause
of this progression, it would not aspire after its cause. For every
thing which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover,
every thing aspires after good, and to each thing the attainment of it
is through the proximate cause. Every thing, therefore, aspires after
its cause. For well-being is derived to every thing from that through
which its existence is derived. But appetite is first directed to that
through which well-being is derived. And conversion is to that to which
appetite is first directed.
PROPOSITION XXXII.
All conversion is effected through the similitude of the things
converted to that to which they are converted.
* * * * *
For every thing which is converted, hastens to be conjoined with its
cause,[226] and aspires after communion and colligation with it. But
similitude binds all things together, just as dissimilitude separates
and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion is a certain
communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through
similitude,--if this be the case, all conversion will be effected
through similitude.
PROPOSITION XXXIII.
Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing and is converted to it,
has a circular energy.
* * * * *