The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it conjoins the end
to the beginning, and the motion is one and continued; one motion being
from that which abides, but the other being directed to the abiding
cause. Hence all things proceed in a circle from causes to causes;
greater and less circles being continually formed of conversions, some
of which are to the natures [immediately] placed above the things that
are converted, but others are to still higher natures, and so on as far
as to the principle of all things. For all things proceed from this
principle, and are converted to it.
PROPOSITION XXXIV.
Every thing which is converted according to nature, makes its
conversion to that, from which also it had the progression of its
proper hypostasis.
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For if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential
desire of that to which it is converted. But if this be the case, the
whole being of it is suspended from that to which it makes an essential
conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also it has a
natural sympathy with, as being allied to the essence of it. If this,
however, be the case, either the being of both is the same, or the
one is derived from the other, or both are allotted similitude from a
certain other one. But if the being of both is the same, how is the one
naturally converted to the other? And if both are from a certain one,
it will be according to nature for both to be converted to that one. It
remains, therefore, that the one must derive its being from the other.
But if this be the case, the progression will be from that to which the
conversion is according to nature.
COROLLARY.
From these things, therefore, it is evident that intellect is the
object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect,
and that the whole world though it is perpetual possesses its essence
from intellect. For it is not prevented from proceeding from intellect
because it is perpetual. For neither because it is always arranged is
it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially
perpetual, and is always converted, and indissoluble according to order.
PROPOSITION XXXV.
Every thing caused, abides in, proceeds from, and returns, or is
converted to, its cause.
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