The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For if it is generated, because generated indeed, it will be imperfect
of itself, and will be indigent of perfection from another. Because,
however, it produces itself, it is perfect and sufficient to itself.
For every thing generated is perfected by another which imparts
generation to it not yet[231] existing. For generation is a path from
the imperfect to its contrary the perfect. But if any thing produces
itself, it is always perfect, being always present with the essence
of itself, or rather being inherent in that which is perfective of
essence.
PROPOSITION XLVI.
Every thing self-subsistent is incorruptible.
* * * * *
For if it should be corrupted, it would desert itself, and would be
without itself. This however is impossible. For being one thing, it is
at the same time cause and the thing caused. But every thing which is
corrupted, departing from the cause of itself is corrupted. For so far
as it adheres to that which contains, connects and preserves it, it is
connected and preserved. But that which is self-subsistent never leaves
its cause, because it does not desert itself; for it is the cause of
itself. Every thing therefore self-subsistent is incorruptible.
PROPOSITION XLVII.
Every thing self-subsistent, is impartible and simple.
* * * * *
For if it is partible, being self-subsistent, it will constitute itself
partible,[232] and the whole will be converted to itself, and all
will be in all itself. This however is impossible. Hence that which
is self-subsistent is impartible. But it is also simple. For if a
composite, one thing in it will be less, but another more excellent,
and the more will be derived from the less excellent, and the less
from the more excellent, if the whole proceeds from itself. Farther
still, it would not be sufficient to itself, being indigent of the
elements of itself of which it consists. Every thing therefore, which
is self-subsistent, is simple.
PROPOSITION XLVIII.
_Concerning the perpetual, in order to demonstrate that the world is
perpetual._
Every thing which is not perpetual, is either a composite, or subsists
in another.
* * * * *
For either it is dissoluble into those things of which it consists, and
is entirely composed from the things into which it is dissolved, or
it is indigent of a subject, and leaving the subject it departs into
non-entity. But if it is simple in itself, it will be indissoluble, and
incapable of being dissipated.
PROPOSITION XLIX.
Every thing self-subsistent is perpetual.
* * * * *