The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For there are two modes according to which it is necessary a thing
should not be perpetual; the one arising from composition, and the
other from a subsistence in something else [as in a subject]. That
which is self-subsistent however, is neither a composite, but simple,
nor in another, but in itself. Hence it is perpetual.
PROPOSITION L.
Every thing which is measured by time, either according to essence, or
according to energy, is generation, so far as it is measured by time.
* * * * *
For if it is measured by time, it will be adapted to it to be, or to
energize in time; and the _was_ and the _will be_, which differ from
each other, pertain to it. For if the _was_ and the _will be_ were the
same according to number, it would suffer nothing by time proceeding,
and always having one part prior, and another posterior. If therefore
the _was_ and the _will be_ are different, that which is measured by
time is becoming to be [or rising into existence], and never _is_,[233]
but proceeds together with time, by which it is measured, existing in
a tendency to being.
It likewise does not stop in the same state of being, but is always
receiving another and another _to be_, just as _the now_ in time is
always another and another, through the progression of time. Hence
it is not a simultaneous whole; for it subsists in a dispersion of
temporal extension, and is co-extended with time. This however is
to possess being in non-being. For that which is becoming to be is
not that which is become. Such a kind of being therefore as this is
generation.
PROPOSITION LI.
Every thing self-subsistent, is essentially exempt from the natures
which are measured by time.
* * * * *
For if that which is self-subsistent is unbegotten, it will not
according to existence be measured by time. For generation is
conversant with the nature which is measured by time. Hence nothing
self-subsistent has its being in time.
PROPOSITION LII.
Every thing eternal is a whole which subsists at once. And whether
it has its essence alone eternal, it will possess the whole at once
present, nor will it have _this_ thing pertaining to itself now
subsisting, but _that_ afterwards which as yet is not; but as
much as is possible it now possesses the whole without diminution,
and without extension. Or whether it has its energy as well as its
essence at once present, it possesses this also collectively, abiding
in the same measure of perfection, and as it were, fixed immoveably and
without transition according to one and the same boundary.
* * * * *