The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
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For if the eternal, as the name denotes, is perpetual being, but to be
sometimes,[234] and to subsist in becoming to be, are different from
perpetual being, it is not proper that it should have one thing prior
and another posterior. For if it had, it would be generation, and not
being. But where there is neither prior nor posterior, nor was and
will be, but alone _to be_, and this a whole, there every thing
subsists at once that which it is. The same thing also takes place with
respect to the energy of that which is eternal.
COROLLARY.
From this it is evident that eternity is the cause to wholes of
their existence as wholes, since every thing which is eternal either
according to essence, or according to energy, has the whole of its
essence or energy present with itself.
PROPOSITION LIII.
_Concerning Eternity and Eternal Natures._
Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and time exists prior
to every thing which subsists according to time.
* * * * *
For if every where the natures which are participated are prior to
their participants, and imparticipables are prior to participated
natures, it is evident that the eternal is one thing, the eternity
which is in the eternal, another, and eternity itself, another. And
the first of these indeed subsists as a participant, the second as a
thing participated, and the third as an imparticipable. That also which
is in time is one thing; for it is a participant. The time which is
in this is another thing; for it is participated. And the time prior
to this is another thing; for it is imparticipable. Every where also,
that which is imparticipable is in all things the same. But that which
is participated is in those things only by which it is participated.
For there are many eternal, and many temporal natures in all of which
eternity subsists according to participation. The time also which is
in temporal natures subsists in a distributed manner; but the time
which they participate is indivisible. And there is one time prior to
both these. Eternity itself likewise is an eternity of eternities, and
time itself is a time of times; and they give subsistence, the one to
participated eternity, but the other to participated time.
PROPOSITION LIV.
Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and every time is the
measure of things in time; and these are the only two measures of life
and motion in beings.
* * * * *
For every thing which measures, either measures according to a part,
or it measures the whole at once when it is adapted to that which is
measured. That which measures, therefore, according to the whole is
eternity; but that which measures according to parts is time. Hence,
there are only two measures, the one of things eternal, but the other
of things in time.
PROPOSITION LV.