The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
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For if the one is the cause of a less, but the other of a greater
number of effects, but the former are parts of the latter, that which
gives subsistence to a greater number of effects, will produce all that
the other produces; but not vice versa. Hence the former of these two
is more powerful and more comprehensive. For as that which proceeds is
to that which proceeds, so is one productive power to another, when
assumed with reference to each other. For that which is able to effect
a greater number of things, possesses a greater and more total power.
But this is nearer to the cause of all things. That however, which is
nearer to this cause, is in a greater degree good, just as the cause
of all is _the good_ itself. Hence, that which is the cause of
a greater number of effects, is essentially more excellent than that
which produces a less number.
PROPOSITION LXI.
Every power which is impartible is greater, but when divided is less.
* * * * *
For if it is divided it proceeds into multitude. And if this be the
case, it becomes more remote from _the one_. But in consequence of
this it is able to effect a less number of things, through departing
from _the one_, and the unity which contains it, and will be
imperfect, since the good of every thing consists in union.
PROPOSITION LXII.
Every multitude which is nearer to _the one_, is less in quantity
than things more remote from it, but is greater in power.
* * * * *
For that which is nearer to is more similar to _the one_. But _the
one_ gives subsistence to all things, without having any multitude in
itself. Hence that which is more similar to it, being the cause of a
greater number of effects, since _the one_ is the cause of all things,
has more the form of unity, and is more impartible, because that is
_one_. As therefore, that which is less multiplied, is more allied to
_the one_, so likewise as being allied to the cause of all things, it
is productive of a greater number of effects. Hence it is more powerful.
COROLLARY.
From these things it is evident, that there are more corporeal natures
than souls; more souls than intellectual natures; and more intellects
than divine unities. And there is the same reasoning in all things.
PROPOSITION LXIII.
Every thing which is imparticipable gives subsistence to two-fold
orders of participated natures, one indeed in things which sometimes
participate, but the other in things which always and connascently
participate.
* * * * *