The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
PROPOSITION LVIII.
Every thing which is produced by many, is more compounded than that
which is produced by fewer causes.
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For if every cause imparts something to that which proceeds from
it, more numerous causes will impart a greater number of gifts, but
less numerous causes a less number. Hence, of participants some will
consist of a greater number of things, but others, of a less number,
of which each participates, some indeed through a progression from a
greater number of causes, but others from a less. Those, however, which
proceed from a greater number of causes are more compounded, but those
from a less number of the same causes, are more simple. Every thing,
therefore, which is produced by a greater number of causes, is more
compounded, but that which is produced by a less number is more simple.
For the more compounded participates of those things of which the more
simple participates, but the contrary to this is not true.
PROPOSITION LIX.
Every thing which is essentially simple, is either better or worse than
composite natures.
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For if such beings as are the extremes of things are produced by fewer
and more simple causes, but such as are in the middle, from a greater
number of causes, the latter indeed will be composites, but of the
former, some are more simple according to that which is better, but
others according to that which is worse. That the extremes, however,
are produced by fewer causes is evident, because such natures as are
higher begin to produce prior to such as are subordinate, and extend
beyond them, to things to which subordinate natures do not proceed
through a diminution of power. For on this account also, the last of
things, [i.e. matter] is most simple, as well as the first of things,
because it proceeds from the first alone. With respect to simplicity,
however, one kind subsists according to that which is better than all
composition, but another according to that which is worse. And there is
the same reasoning in all things.
PROPOSITION LX.
Every thing which is the cause of a greater number of effects, is
better than that which is allotted a power of producing a less number,
and which produces the parts of those things to the wholes of which the
other gives subsistence.
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