The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For either that which is produced is seen in that which produces, as
pre-existing in cause, because every cause antecedently comprehends in
itself the thing caused, being that primarily which the thing caused is
secondarily. Or that which produces is seen in that which is produced.
For the latter participating of the former, exhibits in itself
secondarily that which the producing cause is primarily. Or each thing
is beheld in its own order, and is neither seen in the cause nor in the
effect. For the cause subsists more excellently than that which exists
[out of the cause]. But that which is in the effect is less excellent
than that which exists out of the cause [but is not in any thing else].
It is, however, necessary there should be that which after this manner
_is_. But every thing subsists according to hyparxis in its own
order.
PROPOSITION LXVI.
All beings with reference to each other, are either wholes, or parts,
or the same, or different.
* * * * *
For either some of then comprehend, but the rest are comprehended, or
they neither comprehend, nor are comprehended. And they either suffer
something which is the same, as participating of one thing, or they are
separated from each other. But if they comprehend, they will be wholes,
and if they are comprehended, parts. If also many things participate
of one thing, they are the same according to this one. But if they are
alone many things, so far as they are many they will be different from
each other.
PROPOSITION LXVII.
Every wholeness (ολοτης) is either prior to parts, or consists of
parts, or is in a part.
* * * * *
For the form of each thing is either surveyed in its cause, and we
call that which subsists in its cause a whole prior to parts. Or it
is seen in the parts which participate of it; and this in a two-fold
respect. For it is either seen in all the parts together, and this is
a whole consisting of parts, any part of which being absent diminishes
the whole. Or it is seen in each of the parts, so that the part also
becomes according to participation a whole; which makes the part to
be a whole partially. The whole, therefore, which is according to
hyparxis consists of parts. But the whole which is prior to parts is
according to cause. And the whole which is in a part is according to
participation. For this also according to an ultimate diminution is a
whole, so far as it imitates the whole which consists of parts, when
it is not any casual part, but is capable of being assimilated to the
whole, of which the parts also are wholes.
PROPOSITION LXVIII.
Every whole which is in a part, is a part of that whole which consists
of parts.
* * * * *