The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For if it is a part, it is a part of a certain whole. And it is either
a part of the whole which it contains, according to which it is said
to be a whole in a part. But thus it will be a part of itself, the
part will be equal to the whole, and each will be the same. Or it is a
part of a certain other whole. And if of some other, it is either the
only part of that, and thus again, it will in no respect differ from
the whole, being one part of one thing. Or it is a part in conjunction
with another part. For of every whole the parts are more than one, and
that will be a whole from many parts, of which it consists. And thus
the whole which is in a part, is a part of the whole which consists of
parts.
PROPOSITION LXIX.
Every whole which consists of parts, participates of the wholeness
which is prior to parts.
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For if it consists of parts, the whole is passive [i.e. the whole
participates of another whole]. For the parts becoming one, are passive
to a whole on account of their union, and the whole subsists in parts
which are not wholes. But the imparticipable subsists prior to every
thing which is participated. The imparticipable wholeness, therefore,
subsists prior to that which is participated. Hence, there is a certain
form of wholeness, prior to the whole which consists of parts, which
is not passive to a whole, but is wholeness itself, and from which the
wholeness consisting of parts is derived. For the whole indeed, which
consists of parts, subsists in many places, and in many things, in
various ways. It is, however, necessary that there should be a monad
essentially of all totalities. For neither is each of these wholes
genuine, since it is indigent of parts that are not wholes, of which
it consists. Nor is the whole which is in a certain thing capable of
being the cause of wholeness to all other things. Hence, that which is
the cause to all wholes of their being wholes, is prior to parts. For
if this also consisted of parts, it would be a certain whole, and not
simply whole. And again, this would be from another whole, and so on,
to infinity; or it will subsist on account of that which is primarily a
whole, and which is not a whole from parts, but is a wholeness.
PROPOSITION LXX.
Every thing which is more total among principal causes, illuminates
participants, prior to partial natures, and when these fail, still
continues to impart its illuminations.
* * * * *