The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
PROPOSITION LXXII.
All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject,
proceed from more perfect and total causes.
* * * * *
For the causes of a greater number of effects, are more powerful and
total, and are nearer to _the one_ than the causes of fewer
effects. But the natures which give subsistence to such things as are
antecedently the subjects of others, are among causes the sources of a
greater number of effects.
COROLLARY.
From hence it is evident why matter which derives its subsistence from
_the one_, is of itself destitute of form. And why body, though it
participates of being, is of itself without the participation of soul.
For matter being the subject of all things proceeds from the cause of
all. But body being the subject of animation, derives its subsistence
from that which is more total than soul, and participates after a
certain manner of being.
PROPOSITION LXXIII.
Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of
being, but not every being is a whole.[237]
* * * * *
For either being and whole are the same, or the one is prior, but
the other posterior. If, however, a part, so far as it is a part, is
being (for a whole is from parts which have a being), yet it is not
of itself also a whole. Being, therefore, and whole are not the same.
For if this were the case, a part would be a non-entity. But if a part
was a non-entity, the whole would have no existence. For every whole
is a whole of parts, either as existing prior to them [and therefore
causally containing them in itself], or as subsisting in them. But the
part not existing, neither is it possible for the whole to exist. If,
however, whole is prior to being, every being will immediately be a
whole. Again, therefore, there will not be a part. This, however, is
impossible. For if the whole is a whole, being the whole of a part,
the part also being a part, will be the part of the whole. It remains,
therefore, that every whole indeed is being, but that not every being
is a whole.
COROLLARY.
From these things, it is evident that being which has a primary
subsistence is beyond wholeness. For the one indeed, viz. being, is
present with a greater number of things; since _to be_ is present
with parts, so far as they _are_ parts. But the other, viz.
wholeness, is present with a less number of things. For that which
is the cause of a greater number of effects is more excellent; but
the cause of a less number is of a subordinate nature, as has been
demonstrated.
PROPOSITION LXXIV.
Every form is a certain whole; for it consists of many things, each of
which gives completion to the form. But not every whole is a form.
* * * * *