The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For a particular[238] thing is a whole and also an individual, so
far it is an individual, but neither of them is a form. For every
whole consists of parts; but form is that which may be divided into
individual forms. Whole, therefore, is one thing, and form another. And
the one is present with many things, but the other with a few. Hence,
whole is above the forms of beings.
COROLLARY.
From these things it is evident that whole has a middle order between
being and forms. And hence it follows that being subsists prior to
forms, and that forms are beings, but that not every being is form.
Whence also, in effects, privations are in a certain respect beings,
but are no longer forms, and in consequence of the unical power
of being, they also receive a certain obscure representation of
being.[239]
PROPOSITION LXXV.
Every cause which is properly so called, is exempt from its effect.
* * * * *
For if it is in the effect, it either gives completion to it, or is in
a certain respect indigent of it in order to its existence, and thus it
will be more imperfect than the thing caused. For being in the effect,
it is rather a concause than a cause, and is either a part of that
which is generated, or an instrument of the maker. For that which is
a part in the thing generated, is more imperfect than the whole. The
cause also which is in the effect, is an instrument of generation to
the maker, being unable to define of itself the measures of production.
Every cause, therefore, which is properly so denominated, if it is more
perfect than that which proceeds from it, imparts to its effect the
measure of generation, and is exempt from instruments and elements, and
in short, from every thing which is called a concause.
PROPOSITION LXXVI.
Every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, has a
immutable hyparxis. But every thing which is generated from a moveable
cause, has a mutable hyparxis.
* * * * *