The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For if beings which subsist by themselves, are prior to those which are
_certain_ beings, as being common to all essences, and principal
causes, and not the causes of certain, but in short of all beings, it
is necessary that the first bound, and the first infinity should be
prior to that[246] which consists of both these. For the bound in that
which is mixed [or the first being,] participates of infinity, and
the infinite participates of bound. But of every thing, that which is
the first, is nothing else than that which it is. It is not therefore
proper that the first infinite should have the form of bound, or that
the first bound should have the form of infinity. These therefore
subsist primarily prior to that which is mixed.
PROPOSITION XCI.
Every power is either finite or infinite. But every finite power
indeed derives its subsistence from infinite power. And infinite power
subsists from the first infinity.
* * * * *
For the powers which have an existence at a certain time, are finite,
falling from the infinity of existing always. But the powers of eternal
beings are infinite, never deserting their own hyparxis.
PROPOSITION XCII.
Every multitude of infinite powers, is suspended from one first
infinity, which does not subsist as a participated power, nor in things
which are endued with power, but subsists by itself, not being the
power of a certain participant, but the cause of all beings.
* * * * *
For though the first being possesses power, yet it is not power itself.
For it has also bound. But the first power is infinity. For infinite
powers are infinite, through the participation of infinity. Infinity
itself therefore, will be prior to all powers, through which being
also possesses infinite power, and all things participate of infinity.
For infinity is not the first of things [or the ineffable principle of
all] since that is the measure of all things, being _the good_ and _the
one_. Nor is infinity being. For this is infinite, but not infinity.
Hence infinity subsists between that which is first and being, and is
the cause of all infinite powers, and of all the infinity that is in
beings.
PROPOSITION XCIII.
Every infinite which is in [true] beings, is neither infinite to the
natures that are above beings, nor is it infinite to itself.
* * * * *