The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
PROPOSITION LXXXVII.
Every thing eternal indeed is being, but not every being is eternal.
* * * * *
For the participation of being is present in a certain respect with
generated natures,[244] so far as each of these is not that which in
no respect is. But if that which is generated is not entirely deprived
of being, it is in a certain respect being. The eternal, however, is
in no respect whatever present with generated natures, and especially
not with such of these as do not even participate of the perpetuity
which subsists according to the whole of time. Moreover, every thing
eternal always is. For it participates of eternity, which imparts to
the natures by which it is participated to be always that which they
are. Being, therefore, is participated by a greater number of things
than eternity. And hence being is beyond eternity. For by those natures
by whom eternity is participated, being is also participated. But not
every thing which participates of being, participates also of eternity.
PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.
Every thing[245] which is truly being, is either prior to eternity, or
in eternity, or participates of eternity.
* * * * *
For that there is true being prior to eternity has been demonstrated.
But true being is also in eternity. For eternity possesses the _always_
in conjunction with _being_. And that which participates of eternity,
has both the _always_ and _being_, according to participation.
Eternity, however, possesses the _always_ primarily, but _being_
according to participation. But being itself is primarily being.
PROPOSITION LXXXIX.
Every thing which is primarily being consists of bound and infinity.
* * * * *
For if it possesses infinite power, it is evident that it is
infinite, and on this account consists from the infinite. If also it
is impartible, and has the form of _the one_, through this, it
participates of bound. For that which participates of unity is bounded.
Moreover, it is impartible, and therefore possesses infinite power.
Hence every thing which is truly [or primarily] being consists of bound
and infinity.
PROPOSITION XC.
The first bound, and the first infinity subsist by themselves prior to
every thing which consists of bound and the infinite.
* * * * *