The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For if it were corporeal, if this body indeed is finite,[250] the
infinite will be contained in the finite. But if the body is infinite,
it will not be power so far as it is body. For if so far as it is body
it is finite, but power is infinite, it will not be power so far as
it is body. Hence, the power which is infinite in a finite body is
incorporeal.
PROPOSITION XCVII.
In each series of things, every cause which has the relation of a
leader, imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of itself; and that
which the cause is primarily, the series is according to diminution.
* * * * *
For if it is the leader of the whole series, and all co-ordinate
natures are co-arranged with reference to it, it is evident that it
imparts to all that the series contains the one idea according to which
they are arranged in that series. For either all things partake of
similitude to this cause without a cause, or that which is the same
in all is derived from it. But the former of these is impossible. For
that which is without a cause is also fortuitous. But the fortuitous
can never take place in things in which there is order, connection,
and an invariable sameness of subsistence. From the cause therefore,
which ranks as a leader, every series receives the peculiarity of the
hypostasis of that cause. But if from it, it is evident that this
is accompanied with a diminution and decrement adapted to secondary
natures. For either the peculiarity exists similarly in the leader,
and the natures that are secondary, and how in this case can the
former be the leader, but the latter be allotted an hypostasis after
the leader? Or it exists dissimilarly. And if this be the case, it is
evident that sameness is derived to the multitude from one thing, but
not vice versa. And the illustrious peculiarity of the series which is
primarily in one thing [or the leader,] is secondarily in the multitude
[suspended from the leading cause].
PROPOSITION XCVIII.
Every separate cause is at one and the same time every where and no
where.
* * * * *