The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
For by the communication of its own power it is every where. For this
is a cause which replenishes the natures that are naturally adapted
to participate of it, rules over all secondary beings, and is present
to all things by the prolific progressions of its illuminations.
But by an essence unmingled with things in place, and by its exempt
purity, it is no where. For if it is separate, it is established above
all things. In a similar manner also, it is in no one of the natures
inferior to itself. For if it was alone every where, it would not
indeed be prevented from being a cause, and from subsisting in all its
participants. But it would not be prior to all of them in a separate
manner. If also it was no where without being every where, it would
not indeed be prevented from being prior to all things, and from being
nothing pertaining to subordinate natures. But it would not be in all
things, as causes are naturally adapted to be in their effects,[251]
by the abundant and unenvying communications of themselves. In order
therefore, that existing as a cause, it may be in all things that are
able to partake of it, and that being separate in itself, it may be
prior to all the natures that are filled by it, it is every where, and
at the same time no where.
And it is not indeed partly every where and partly no where. For thus
it would be divulsed and separate from itself, if one part of it was
every where in all things, but another was no where, and prior to all
things. But the whole of it is every where, and in a similar manner no
where. For the things which are able to participate of it, meet with
the whole of it, and find the whole present with themselves, that at
the same time being wholly exempt from them. For the participant does
not place this separate cause in itself, but participates of it as much
as it is capable of receiving. Nor in the communication of itself does
it become contracted by the multitude of the participations of it; for
it is separate. Nor do its participants participate of it defectively;
for that which imparts is every where.
PROPOSITION XCIX.
Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, does not derive
its subsistence from another cause. But it is itself the principle and
cause of all its participants. And thus every principle in each series
is unbegotten.
* * * * *