The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
the first [monad] of the triad,[24] unically comprehends the third, the
third is converted to the first, and the middle has a power extending
to both. There are, therefore, these three vivific monads, viz. Diana,
Proserpine, and our mistress Minerva. And the first of these indeed is
the summit of the whole triad, and which also converts to herself the
third. But the second is a power vivific of wholes. And the third is
a divine and undefiled intellect, comprehending in one, in a ruling
manner, total virtues. Timæus, therefore, manifests this, calling
the third monad (Minerva) philosophic, as being full of intellectual
knowledge, and true wisdom; but philopolemic, as the cause of undefiled
power, and the inspective guardian of the whole of fortitude. And
again, the Athenian guest, calls her Core, as being a virgin, and as
purifying from all conversion to externals.
If, however, you are willing, we will survey the triad of Core, from
what is said in the Cratylus concerning Pherephatta. She is called,
therefore, wisdom, and is said to come into contact with that which
is generated and borne along; she also produces fear in those that
hear her name, and excites astonishment in the multitude. With respect
to the appellation of wisdom, therefore, it is evident that it is a
sign [of the characteristic property] of Minerva, and the summit of
virtue. For if in us, all the sciences are the first of the virtues,
how is it possible that wisdom should not be rightly denominated, the
first-effective cause of all the virtues? And if philosophy pertains
to her, so far as she is wisdom, and immaterial intelligence, but
not because she is indigent of wisdom, (for no one of the Gods, says
Diotima, philosophizes), on this account, therefore, she is not
indigent of wisdom; and the intellectual good of the ruling order
entirely pertains to her. But to come into contact with that which
is borne along, and with generation, will in a particular manner
be adapted to soul. For it is soul that knows every thing which is
generated, and continually communicates with it. She, likewise, in a
certain respect comes entirely into contact with that which is borne
along. Moreover, the incommensurability of Pherephatta with multitude,
and the terrour and astonishment which she excites, are indicative of
the power in her which is exempt from all things, which is unapparent
to the many and unknown. For the Barbarians also [i.e. the Chaldeans,]
call the Goddess who is the leader of this triad, dire and terrible.
Hence Plato does not more clearly indicate these things to us about
this mighty Goddess [than the Barbarians;] but he announces names
adapted to the theology concerning her.