Farther still, in the Phædo, teaching us what the mode of the cathartic life of souls is, he says “that the soul when it does not associate with the body, comes into contact with [true] being.” Through all these particulars, therefore, he indicates that contact is the work of an inseparable providence, and of a co-arranged administration; but that the negation of contact is the business of a prefecture, separate, unrestrained, and exempt from the subjects of government. _The one_, therefore, which touches and does not touch other things, is conjoined with other things, and established above them. Hence, at one and the same time it is allotted the power of things established above the world, and of mundane natures. For being in the middle of both, it comprehends in one the divided peculiarities of the extremes. And moreover, it touches, and does not touch itself prior to other things; because there are in it multitude, a separation of wholeness, and the parts of wholeness, and a union collective of all the multitude. For if it has proceeded from its principles, and if it energizes partibly, it is various and multiform. For every progression diminishes indeed, the powers of the proceeding natures, but increases the multitude which is in them, and if it has not entirely proceeded, the uniform nature of its essence shines forth to the view, at one and the same time, with the multitude it contains. This genus of Gods, therefore, is co-arranged with the mundane Gods, and transcends the subjects of its government. It is also liberated, being separated from things which are perfectly divided. Hence, if it is one and multitude, producing indeed into secondary natures the many rivers of the fountains, but surpassing partible allotments, it will at one and the same time touch and not touch itself. On account of its separate union indeed, it is not in want of contact; but on account of its progression into multitude, it touches itself. “For it comprehends many things in itself, and touches itself, so far as it is in itself,” says Parmenides.[1] In short, so far as it is without contact, it is separate; but so far as it proceeds from itself, and is again established in itself, it touches itself. And so far indeed, as it is in other things, it comes into contact with other things; but so far as it is uncoarranged with others, and so far as it has not a co-ordinate number in them, it is separated from them. At one and the same time therefore, this genus of Gods is uniform and multiplied, and is uniformly varied. It also abides and proceeds, and is participated by more imperfect natures, and is imparticipable, existing prior to them. All these particulars, however, are the elements of the supercelestial order, presenting to our view an hypostasis mingled from perfectly divided peculiarities. And thus much concerning the essence and hyparxis of these Gods, which Parmenides exhibits to us in the above citation.