The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p — Plato — John Shaqi
The six books of Proclus, the Platonic successor, on the theology of Plato (vol. 2 of 2) : $b translated from the Greek, to which a seventh book is added, in order to supply the deficiency of another book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost, also, a translation from the Greek of Proclus' Elements of theology, to which are added a translation of the treatise of Proclus, On providence and fate, a translation of extracts from his treatise, entitled, Ten doubts concerning p
Plato · en
the unapparent, and the mundane with the supermundane.
CHAPTER VI.
And thus much concerning the whole conception of the speech. It is
necessary, however, since we have said the words are demiurgic or
fabricative, that they should be received in a manner adapted to
demiurgic providence. But if these words are intellectual conceptions,
and the intellectual conceptions themselves are productions, what shall
we say the demiurgus effects in the multitude of mundane Gods by the
first words of his speech? Is it not evident we must say that this
energy of his is deific? For this one divine intellectual conception
which is the first and most simple proceeding from the demiurgus,
deifies all the recipients of it, and makes them demiurgic Gods,
participated Gods, and Gods unapparent, and at the same time apparent.
For this, as has been said, is the meaning of “Gods of Gods.” For
the term Gods is not alone adapted to them; since they are not alone
unapparent; nor the word Gods twice enunciated, as if some one should
say Gods and Gods; for every bond of this kind is artificial, and
foreign from divine union.
It is also necessary to observe that every mundane God has an animal
suspended from him, according to which he is denominated mundane. He
has likewise a divine soul, which rules over its depending vehicle; and
an immaterial and separate intellect, according to which he is united
to the intelligible, in order that he may imitate the world in which
all these are contained. And by the animal suspended from him, he is
indeed a part of the sensible universe; but by intellect he belongs to
an intelligible essence; and by soul he conjoins the impartible life
which is in him, with the life that is divisible about body. Such a
composition, however, being triple in each mundane God, neither does
Plato here deliver the demiurgus speaking to intellects; for intellects
subsist in unproceeding union with the divine intellect, and are
entirely unbegotten; but soul is the first of generated natures, and
a little after the demiurgus addresses these when he says, “since ye
are generated.” Nor does he represent the demiurgus as speaking only
to the animals which are suspended from the souls of these Gods; for
they pertain to corporeal natures, and are not adapted to enjoy the one
demiurgic intelligence, without a medium. Nor yet does he represent him
as speaking to souls by themselves; for they are entirely immortal;
but the Gods whom he now addresses are said by him not[72] to be in
every respect immortal. If therefore it be requisite for me to say
what appears to me to be the truth, the words of the demiurgus are
addressed to the composite from soul and animal, viz. to the animal
which is divine, and partakes of a soul. For intellect does not know
the demiurgic will through reason, but through intelligence, or in
other words, through intellectual vision; nor through conversion, but