49. _Socr._ I say, then, that these are two questions, and I will give you an answer to both. For I affirm, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have very little power in cities, as I just now said: for they do scarcely any thing that they wish, though they do what to them appears to be best. _Pol._ Is not this, then, to possess great power? _Socr._ It is not, at least as Polus says. _Pol._ I say not? On the contrary, I say it is. _Socr._ By Jupiter, not you. For you said that to have great power is a good to him who possesses it. _Pol._ And I repeat it. _Socr._ Do you think, then, it is a good for any one to do what appears to him to be best, when he is void of understanding? And do you call this to possess great power? 50. _Pol._ Not I. _Socr._ Prove, therefore, that rhetoricians are possessed of understanding, and that rhetoric is an art, and not flattery, if you mean to confute me. But, if you will leave me unconfuted, rhetoricians and tyrants, who do in cities whatever they please, will derive no good from thence. Power is, as you say, good; but to do, without understanding, whatever one pleases, you yourself admit is an evil. Is it not so? _Pol._ I do. _Socr._ How then can rhetoricians or tyrants have great power in cities, unless Socrates is persuaded by Polus to admit that they do what they wish? _Pol._ What a strange man! _Socr._ I deny that they do what they wish: but confute me. _Pol._ Did you not just now admit that they do what appears to them to be best? _Socr._ And I now admit it. _Pol._ They do, therefore, what they wish. _Socr._ I deny it. _Pol._ But they do what appears best to them? _Socr._ I grant it. _Pol._ You speak absurdly and monstrously, Socrates. [51.] _Socr._ Do not accuse me, most excellent Polus, that I may address you in your own style; but, if you have any other question to ask me, shew that I am deceived; if not, do you answer me. _Pol._ I am willing to answer, in order that I may know what you mean. _Socr._ Whether, then, do men appear to you to wish the thing that they do from time to time, or that for the sake of which they do the thing that they do? As for instance, do those who drink medicine from physicians appear to you to wish the thing that they do, viz., to drink the medicine, and suffer pain, or do they wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine? _Pol._ It is clear they wish to be well, for the sake of which they drink the medicine. _Socr._ In like manner those who sail on the sea, and those who carry on any other commercial business, do not wish the thing that they do from time to time: for who wishes to sail and to encounter danger, and to be harassed with business; but the object for which they sail is to acquire riches; for they sail for the sake of riches. _Pol._ Certainly. _Socr._ Is it not so then in all cases? whosoever does any thing for the sake of some thing else, does not wish the thing that he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.