_Pol._ Yes. 52. _Socr._ Is there any thing in the world, then, that is not either good or evil, or between these, neither good nor evil? _Pol._ It must needs be so, Socrates. _Socr._ Do you not admit then, that wisdom, and health, and riches, and other things of the same kind, are good, but their contraries evil? _Pol._ I do. _Socr._ By the things that are neither good nor evil do you not mean such as sometimes partake of good, sometimes of evil, and sometimes of neither, as to sit, to walk, to run, and to sail, and again, stones, wood, and other things of the same kind? Are not these the things that you mean? Or do you call certain other things neither good nor evil? _Pol._ No, but these. _Socr._ Whether, therefore, do men, when they do these intermediate things, do them for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the intermediate. _Pol._ The intermediate, surely, for the sake of the good. _Socr._ Pursuing the good, therefore, we both walk when we walk, thinking it better, and, on the contrary, we stand when we stand, for the sake of the same thing, viz., the good. Is it not so? _Pol._ Yes. 53. _Socr._ Do we not, therefore, if we slay any one, slay, or banish, or deprive him of his possessions, thinking that it is better for us to do so than not? _Pol._ Certainly. _Socr._ They, therefore, who do these things do them all for the sake of good. _Pol._ I allow it. _Socr._ Are we not agreed, then, that we do not wish those things which we do for the sake of something else, but that for the sake of which we do them? _Pol._ By all means. _Socr._ We do not, then, wish simply to slay, or banish from cities, or deprive any one of his possessions; but if these things are useful we wish to do them, but if they are hurtful we do not wish to do them. For we wish, as you admit, things that are good, but we do not wish such as are neither good nor evil, nor such as are evil. Is it not so? Do I seem to you, Polus, to speak the truth, or not? Why do you not answer? _Pol._ You speak the truth. _Socr._ Since then we are agreed on these things, if any one slays, banishes from a city, or deprives another of his possessions, whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician, thinking that it is better for him so to do, though it is really worse, he surely does what seems fit to him: is it not so? _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ Does he, then, do what he wishes, if these things are really evil? Why do you not answer? _Pol._ He does not appear to me to do what he wishes. 54. _Socr._ Is it possible, then, that such a man can have great power in the supposed city, if, according to your admission, to have great power is a good? _Pol._ It is not possible. _Socr._ I spoke truly, then, when I said that it is possible for a man to do what he pleases in a city, and yet not have great power, nor do what he wishes.