_Pol._ Certainly not in this way. _Socr._ Can you tell me, then, why you blame a power of this kind? _Pol._ I can. _Socr._ Why then? tell me. _Pol._ Because it must needs be that one who acts thus should be punished. _Socr._ But is not the being punished an evil? _Pol._ Certainly. 57. _Socr._ Therefore, my excellent friend, to have great power appears to you to be, when advantage attends one’s doing what one pleases, and then it is a good; and this, as it seems, is to have great power; but if not, it is an evil, and to have little power. Let us consider this too. Are we not agreed that it is sometimes better to do the things which we just now spoke of, to slay, to banish men, and deprive them of their property, and sometimes not? _Pol._ Certainly. _Socr._ This, then, as it seems, is agreed on both by you and me? _Pol._ Yes. _Socr._ When, then, do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me what limit you establish? _Pol._ Do you, Socrates, answer this question. _Socr._ I say, then, Polus, since it is more agreeable to you to hear it from me, when any one does these things justly, it is better, but when unjustly, it is worse. _Pol._ Forsooth, it is difficult to confute you, Socrates! but could not even a child convince you that you do not speak the truth? _Socr._ I should be very much obliged to the child, and equally so to you, if you can confute me, and free me from my extravagances. But be not weary in obliging a man who is your friend, but confute me. 58. _Pol._ However, Socrates, there is no need to confute you by ancient examples. For things that have recently happened are sufficient to confute you, and to prove that many men who have acted unjustly are happy. _Socr._ What are these? _Pol._ Do you not see, for instance, this Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, ruler of Macedonia? _Socr._ If not, at all events I hear of him. _Pol._ Does he appear to you to be happy or miserable? _Socr._ I do not know, Polus: for I have never yet had any intercourse with him. _Pol._ What then? if you had intercourse with him, should you know? And do you not know otherwise, from the circumstances of the case, that he is happy? _Socr._ By Jupiter, certainly not. _Pol._ It is evident then, Socrates, you will say, that you do not even know whether the great king is happy? _Socr._ And I should say the truth. For I do not know what his state is with regard to enlightenment and justice. _Pol._ What? Does all happiness consist in this? _Socr._ In my opinion, Polus. For I say that an honest and good man or woman is happy; but an unjust and wicked one is miserable. _Pol._ This Archelaus, then, is miserable, according to your account? _Socr._ At least, my friend, if he is unjust.