_Socr._ Will this be the case if he only itches in his head, or must I ask you still further? Consider, Callicles, what answer you would give, if any one asks you respecting all the parts of the body in succession. And to take that which is the chief of all, is not the life of catamites dreadful, base, and wretched? Will you dare to call them happy, if they have what they desire, without stint? _Cal._ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion to such subjects? _Socr._ Do I lead it hither, noble Sir, or does he who asserts thus broadly, that such as rejoice, in whatever way they rejoice, are happy, and does not distinguish between pleasures, what are good and what are bad? But tell me further still, whether do you say that the pleasant and the good are the same: or that there is something pleasant which is not good? _Cal._ In order that my argument may not contradict itself, if I should say they are different, I say that they are the same. 109. _Socr._ You subvert your former statements, Callicles, and no longer search for the truth with me properly, if you speak contrary to your real opinion. _Cal._ And you do the same, Socrates. _Socr._ Neither, then, do I act rightly, if I do so, nor do you. But, good Sir, consider whether to rejoice in any way be not good. For it is clear that many base consequences, which were just now hinted at, will follow, if this should be the case, and many others besides. _Cal._ As you think, at least, Socrates. _Socr._ Do you in reality, Callicles, persist in your assertion? _Cal._ I do. _Socr._ Shall we then enter on the discussion, as if you were in earnest? _Cal._ Most certainly. _Socr._ Come, then, since you are of that opinion, explain this to me. Do you call science any thing? _Cal._ I do. _Socr._ And did you not just now say, that there is a certain courage joined with science? _Cal._ I did say so. _Socr._ Did you speak of these two, as if courage was different from science? _Cal._ Certainly. _Socr._ But what? Are pleasure and science the same, or different? _Cal._ Different, surely, most wise friend. _Socr._ Is courage also different from pleasure? _Cal._ Undoubtedly. 110. _Socr._ Come, then, let us retain these things in our memory; that Callicles of Acharne said that the pleasant and the good are the same; but that science and courage are different both from each other and the good. _Cal._ But Socrates of Alopecia does not agree to this; does he agree? _Socr._ He does not agree: and I think neither will Callicles when he has rightly examined himself. For tell me, do you not think that those who fare well are affected in a manner quite contrary to those who fare ill? _Cal._ I do. _Socr._ If these, therefore, are contrary to each other, is it not necessary that the case should be the same with them as it is with health and disease? For, surely, a man is not at the same time well and diseased, nor at the same time separated from health and disease. _Cal._ How say you?