_Socr._ For instance, take any part of the body you please, and consider. Has not a man sometimes a disease in the eyes, which is called ophthalmia? _Cal._ Undoubtedly. _Socr._ And his eyes, surely, are not at the same time well? _Cal._ Certainly not. _Socr._ But what? When he is freed from the ophthalmia, does he then also lose the health of his eyes, and, in a word, is he at the same time freed from both? _Cal._ By no means. _Socr._ For that, I think, would be wonderful and absurd. Would it not? _Cal._ Assuredly. 111. _Socr._ But I think he, alternately, receives one, and loses the other. _Cal._ I admit it. _Socr._ And will it not be the same with regard to strength and weakness? _Cal._ Yes. _Socr._ And swiftness and slowness? _Cal._ Certainly. _Socr._ And with respect to things good and happiness, and their contraries, things evil and wretchedness, does he receive and part from each of these alternately? _Cal._ Most assuredly. _Socr._ If, therefore, we should find certain things which a man at the same time parts from and possesses, it is clear that these would not be both good and evil. Do we agree to this? Consider well and answer me. _Cal._ I agree entirely. _Socr._ Let us then recur to what was before agreed on. Did you say that to be hungry is pleasant, or painful? I mean the very fact of being hungry. _Cal._ I said it was painful: though to eat when hungry is pleasant. _Socr._ I understand you: but to be hungry of itself is painful; is it not so? _Cal._ I admit it. _Socr._ And also to be thirsty? _Cal._ Assuredly. 112. _Socr._ Whether, then, shall I ask you any more questions? Or do you allow that all want and desire is painful? _Cal._ I allow it; so do not ask. _Socr._ Be it so. And do you not say that for a man to drink when he is thirsty is pleasant? _Cal._ I do. _Socr._ In the instance then of which you are speaking, to be thirsty is, doubtless, painful? _Cal._ Yes. _Socr._ But to drink is the satisfying of a want, and a pleasure? _Cal._ Yes. _Socr._ Therefore as to drinking you say that the man rejoices? _Cal._ Certainly. _Socr._ But as to being thirsty? _Cal._ I say— _Socr._ That he suffers pain? _Cal._ Yes. _Socr._ Do you perceive then what follows? that you say he who is in pain at the same time rejoices, when you say that he who is thirsty drinks. And does not this happen at the same place and time, with respect either to the soul or body, whichever you please? For I think there is no difference. Is this so, or not? _Cal._ It is. _Socr._ You admitted, however, that it was impossible for one who fares well at the same time to fare ill. _Cal._ I allow it. _Socr._ But you have granted that it is possible for one who is in pain to rejoice. _Cal._ It appears so. _Socr._ To rejoice, therefore, is not to fare well, nor to be in pain, ill: so that the pleasant is different from the good? _Cal._ I know not what subtleties you are using, Socrates.