The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum — Plato — John Shaqi
The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum
Plato · en
but if he does need it, either he or any of his family, whether it be
the case of a private person, or a city, justice must be administered,
and punishment inflicted, if he is to be happy. This appears to me to be
the mark to which we ought to look for the guidance of our life, and
referring all private and public actions to this point, that justice and
temperance may be ever present with him who will be blessed, and to act
accordingly, not suffering his desires to be intemperate, nor
endeavouring to satisfy them, which is an irremediable evil, causing a
man to live like a robber. For such an one could neither be dear to any
other man, nor to God; for it is impossible there can be any communion
between them; and where there is no communion there can be no
friendship. 136. The sages[75] too, say, Callicles, that heaven and
earth, gods and men, are held together by communion, friendship, order,
temperance, and justice, and for this reason, my friend, they call this
universe, order[76], and not disorder or intemperance. You, however,
appear to me not to attend to these things, and this though you are
wise; but it has escaped your observation that geometrical equality has
great power both among gods and among men; on the contrary you think
that every one should strive to get more than others; for you neglect
geometry. Well then; either this argument of mine must be confuted, _and
it must be shewn_ that the happy are not happy from the possession of
justice and temperance, and the wretched, wretched from vice; or, if the
argument is true, we must consider what are its results. Now, Callicles,
all those things before mentioned, with respect to which you asked me if
I was speaking in earnest, result from it, to the effect that a man
should accuse himself, his son, and his friend, if he committed any
injustice, and should employ rhetoric for this purpose. And what you
thought Polus granted through shame was therefore true, that by how much
it is more base to do an injury than to be injured, by so much is it
worse: and that he who would be a good orator ought to be just and
skilled in the knowledge of things just; which, again, Polus said
Gorgias acknowledged through shame.
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Footnote 75:
The Pythagoreans, especially Empedocles.
Footnote 76:
Κόσμος, “order,” signifying also “the world.”
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