139. _Socr._ Of these two things then, the doing injustice and receiving an injury, we say that to do injustice is a greater evil, but to receive an injury a less one. By recourse to what means, then, could a man so assist himself as to have both these advantages, that of not doing injustice, and that of not receiving an injury? Is it by power, or will? I mean thus: whether, if a man wishes not to be injured, will he not be injured, or, if he has acquired the power of not being injured, will he not be injured? _Cal._ It is clear that he will not, if he has acquired the power. _Socr._ But what with respect to doing injustice? Whether, if any one wishes not to do injustice, is this sufficient, (for in that case he will not do it,) or, besides this, is it requisite to acquire a certain power and art, so that, unless he has learned and practised them, he will do injustice? Come then, answer me this question, Callicles; whether do Polus and I appear to you to have been compelled, rightly or not, to make that admission in the former part of our discussion, when we admitted that no one willingly commits injustice, but that all who do commit it do so unwillingly? _Cal._ Let that point be granted, Socrates, in order that you may bring the argument to a conclusion. _Socr._ For this purpose, then, as it appears, we must acquire a certain power and art, in order that we may not commit injustice. _Cal._ Certainly. 140. _Socr._ What then is the art by means of which a man will receive no injury at all, or scarcely any? Consider, if it appears to you the same as it does to me. For to me it appears thus; either that he ought to govern in a city or even have absolute power, or be a friend of the existing government. _Cal._ Do you observe, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you, if you say any thing well? This you appear to me to have said remarkably well. _Socr._ Consider also, whether I appear to you to say this well. Each person seems to me for the most part to be a friend to each, according as the ancient sages say “like to like:” does it not seem so to you? _Cal._ It does. _Socr._ Wherever, therefore, a savage and uneducated tyrant governs, if there should be any one in the city much better than him, would not the tyrant fear him, and never be able to be cordially his friend? _Cal._ Such is the case. _Socr._ Nor yet, if any one should be much worse than the tyrant, would he become his friend; for the tyrant would despise him, nor ever feel any affection for him as a friend. _Cal._ This also is true. 141. _Socr._ It remains, therefore, that he alone would be a friend, worthy of notice, to such a man, who, having a similar disposition, should blame and praise the same things, and be willing to be governed by and submit to his sway. Such a person will have great influence in this city, and no one will injure him with impunity. Is it not so? _Cal._ Yes.