The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum
Plato · en
Perhaps, however, these things appear to you to be like an old woman’s
fable, and you accordingly despise them. And it would not be at all
wonderful that we should despise them, if on investigation we could find
any thing better and more true than them. But now you see that you
three, who are the wisest of the Greeks of this day, you, Polus, and
Gorgias, are unable to prove that we ought to live any other life than
such as appears to be advantageous hereafter, but among so many
arguments, while others have been refuted, this alone remains unshaken,
that we ought to beware of committing injustice rather than of being
injured, and that above all a man ought to study not to appear good, but
to be so, both privately and publicly: and that if any one is in any
respect wicked, he should be punished, and that this is the next good to
the being just, to become so[86], and to submit to the punishment one
deserves; and that all flattery, whether of one’s-self or others,
whether of few or many, must be avoided; and that rhetoric, and every
other action, is always to be employed with a view to what is just.
175. Be persuaded by me then, and follow me to that place, by going to
which you will be happy, both living and after you are dead, as your own
argument proves. And suffer any one to despise you as senseless, and to
treat you with contumely, if he pleases, and by Jupiter, do you
cheerfully let him strike that ignominious blow; for you will suffer
nothing dreadful, if you are in reality upright and good, and devoted to
the practice of virtue. And when we have thus exercised ourselves in
common, we will then, if it should appear desirable, apply ourselves to
politics, or we will deliberate on whatever we shall think desirable,
being better qualified to deliberate than we now are. For it is
disgraceful, being in the condition in which we appear to be at present,
to pride ourselves, like youths, as if we were something, who yet never
retain the same opinion on the same subjects, and these of the greatest
moment; to such a pitch of ignorance have we reached! Let us use as our
guide, then, the reasoning that has now been made clear to us, which
teaches us, that this is the best mode of life, to live and to die in
the exercise of justice and the other virtues. This, then, let us
follow, and invite others to do the same, not that, to which you
confidently invited me: for it is of no value, Callicles.
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Footnote 86:
Τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην, Stallbaum translates “to
become just by undergoing the punishment one deserves;” I cannot
extract this meaning from the passage.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE PROTAGORAS.
In this dialogue Socrates relates to a friend, whose name is not given,
a discussion which he had just had with Protagoras the sophist, of
Abdera.