74. In saying this he elicited applause and praise from many of the hearers. And I, at first, as if I had been hit by a skilful boxer, was blinded, and made giddy, by his saying this, and by the applause of the others; but afterwards, to tell you the truth, that I might have time to consider what the poet meant, I turned to Prodicus, and calling out to him, said, “Prodicus, Simonides was your fellow-citizen; you are bound to assist the man. I seem then, to call upon you, in the same manner as Homer[101] says Scamander, when assailed by Achilles, called upon Simois, saying, ‘Dear brother, let us unite to repel the prowess of this man.’ So I call upon you, let not Protagoras overthrow Simonides. For the defence of Simonides requires that exquisite skill of yours, by which you distinguish between to will and to desire, as not being the same, and by which you just now established many and beautiful distinctions. And now consider, whether your opinion agrees with mine: for Simonides does not appear to me to contradict himself. But do you, Prodicus, first declare your opinion. Does it appear to you that to become and to be are the same or different?” ----- Footnote 101: Iliad xxi. 308. ----- “Different by Jupiter,” said Prodicus. 75. “Has not Simonides himself then,” said I, “in the first passage, declared his own opinion, that it is in truth difficult to become a good man?” “You say truly,” replied Prodicus. “But he blames Pittacus,” I continued, “not as Protagoras thinks, for saying the same thing that he had said, but something different. For Pittacus does not say that this is the difficulty, to become a good man, as Simonides does, but this, to be so; but Protagoras, as Prodicus here says, to be and to become are not the same; and if to be and to become are not the same, Simonides does not contradict himself. And perhaps Prodicus here, and many others, may say with Hesiod,[102] ‘that it is difficult to become good; for that the gods have placed sweat before virtue; but when any one has reached its summit, it is then easy to acquire, though before it was difficult.’” ----- Footnote 102: Opp. et Dier. v. 287 &c. ----- 76. Prodicus, on hearing this, commended me; but Protagoras said, “Your defence, Socrates, is more erroneous than the passage which you defend.” And I said, “Then I have done ill, as it seems, Protagoras, and I am an absurd physician; in attempting to cure, I make the disease worse.” “So it is however,” he said. “But how?” I asked. “Great must have been the poet’s ignorance,” he replied, “if he asserts that virtue is so easy a thing to be acquired, whereas it is the most difficult of all, as all men think.”