It appears to me, that you and I ought rather to imitate such persons as these, and setting aside the poets should discourse with each other, from our own resources, and receive proof of the truth and of ourselves. And if you still wish to question me, I am ready to offer myself to answer you; but if you do not wish it, do you offer yourself to me, so that we may bring to a conclusion the subject that we broke off in the middle.” 93. On my saying these and other things of the same kind, Protagoras did not distinctly declare which of the two he would do. Alcibiades, therefore, looking to Callias, said, “Callias, does Protagoras appear to you to act rightly now, in not being willing to declare whether he will answer or not? For to me he does not. But let him either continue the conversation, or say that he is not willing to continue it, that we may know this from him, and that Socrates may converse with some one else, or whoever else wishes to do so with some other.” And Protagoras, being ashamed, as it seemed to me, when Alcibiades spoke thus and Callias and nearly all who were present entreated him, was with great difficulty prevailed on to renew the conversation and bade me question him, for that he would answer. 94. I then said to him, “Protagoras, think not that I converse with you with any other design, than to examine thoroughly into things about which I am continually in doubt. For I think that Homer[103] speaks very much to the purpose, when he says, ‘When two come together, one apprehends before the other.’ For all of us men are thus more prompt in every deed, and word, and thought, but when any one apprehends alone[104], he immediately goes about and searches for some one to whom he may communicate it, and with whom he may establish it, until he finds him. So I too, for this reason, am better pleased to converse with you than with any one else, thinking that you are best able to investigate both other subjects which a good man is likely to examine into, and especially virtue. For who else can do it but you? Since you not only think yourself to be a good and worthy man, as some others also are virtuous, but are not able to make others so; you however are both good yourself, and are able to make others good, and you have such confidence in yourself, that while others conceal this art, you openly proclaim yourself to all the Greeks designating yourself a sophist, publishing yourself as a professor of erudition and virtue, and you are the first that has thought fit to receive pay for this. 95. How then, is it not right to call upon you to the examination of these matters, and to question and communicate with you respecting them? It cannot be otherwise. Now therefore I am desirous that the questions which I first asked you on these subjects, should, from the commencement, be partly called to mind by you, and partly to consider them with you. The question, I think, was this; whether these, wisdom, temperance, courage,