The works of Plato (Vol. 1 of 6) : $b A new and literal version chiefly from the text of Stallbaum
Plato · en
justice, and holiness, which are five names, belong to one thing, or
whether a certain peculiar essence is attached to each of these names,
and each thing has its own function, and no one of them is the same as
any other? You said, then, that these were not names belonging to one
thing, but that each of these names was applied to a distinct thing, and
that all these are parts of virtue, not in the same manner as the parts
of gold are similar to each other, and to the whole of which they are
parts, but just as the parts of the face are dissimilar to the whole of
which they are parts, and to each other, each possessing its peculiar
function. If these things still appear to you as they did then, say so;
if otherwise, explain the difference, since I shall not think you in any
way accountable, if you happen to speak differently; for I should not
wonder if you said these things before for the purpose of trying me.”
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Footnote 103:
Iliad x. 224.
Footnote 104:
Iliad x. 225.
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96. “But I,” he said, “tell you, Socrates, that all these are parts of
virtue, and four of them are very like each other, but courage is very
different from all these. And thus you will know that I speak the truth;
for you will find many men who are most unjust, most unholy, most
intemperate, and most ignorant, yet eminently courageous.”
“Hold,” said I, “for what you say is worth examining. Do you mean that
courageous men are daring, or some thing else?”
“I do,” he replied, “and bold to rush headlong on dangers which most men
are afraid to encounter.”
“Come then; do you say, that virtue is something beautiful? and as being
a beautiful thing do you offer to teach it?”
“Most beautiful,” he replied, “unless I am out of my senses.”
97. “Whether then,” said I, “is one part of it base, and another
beautiful, or, is it all beautiful?”
“All beautiful, surely, in the highest degree.”
“Do you know, then, who boldly dive into wells?”
“I do, divers.”
“Whether because they know how to do it, or for some other reason?”
“Because they know how to do it.”
“But who are they that fight boldly on horseback? whether good riders or
bad?”
“Good riders.”
“And who with targets? those that are targeteers, or those that are
not?”
“Those that are targeteers. And in every thing else,” said he, “if this
is what you are enquiring about, you will find that those who are
skilled, are bolder than the unskilled, and the same men, after they
have learnt are bolder than they were before they learnt.”
98. “But did you ever see any,” said I, “who, though unskilled in all
these things, were yet bold with respect to each of them?”
“I have,” he replied, “and very bold.”
“Are those bold persons, then, courageous also?”
“If they were,” he replied, “courage would be a base thing; for these
men are mad.”
“How then,” I asked, “do you describe the courageous? did you not say
that they are the bold?”
“And I say so now,” he replied.