“Let us now change the names, and again apply the words pleasant and painful to these same things, and let us say, that a man does things, we before called them evil, but let us now call them painful, knowing that they are painful, being overcome by pleasant things, clearly such as are unworthy to prevail. And what other value is there of pleasure in comparison with pain, except that of excess or defect in one or the other? that is, of their being greater or less, more or fewer in number, stronger or weaker than one another. 112. For if any one should say, ‘But Socrates, immediate pleasure is very different from future pleasure or pain,’ ‘Is it,’ I should ask, ‘in any thing else than in pleasure and pain?’ for it cannot differ in any thing else. But like a man expert at weighing, having put together the pleasant things, and having put together the painful, and having placed those which are near, and those which are remote, in the scales, say which are the more numerous. For if you weigh pleasures with pleasures, the greater and more numerous are always to be chosen, and if pains with pains, the less and the fewer in number. But if you weigh pleasures with pains, if the pains are exceeded by the pleasures, whether those that are near by those that are remote, or those that are remote by those that are near, the same course must be pursued, in whichever the excess is; but if the pleasures are exceeded by the pains, it must not be pursued. ‘Can these things be settled in any other way, my friends,’ I should ask? 113. I know that they could not mention any other.” It seemed so to him likewise. “Since then, this is the case, I shall say ‘Answer me this, do the same magnitudes appear to your sight greater when near, and less when at a distance, or not?’ They will say they do. ‘And things bulky, and things numerous, in like manner? and are not equal sounds greater when near, but less when at a distance?’ They would say they are. If then, our well-being consisted in this, in making and choosing great masses, but in avoiding and not making little ones, what means of safety should we seem to have in life? Would it be the art of mensuration, or the faculty of judging by appearances? or would the latter lead us into error, and often cause us to vary in our choice of the same thing, now choosing one and now another, and to repent both in our actions and our selections of things great and little, but would the art of mensuration do away with this outward show, and making manifest the truth, cause the soul to be at ease, abiding in the truth, and preserve our life?’ Would the men upon this admit that the art of mensuration preserves us, or some other art?” 114. “The art of mensuration,” he admitted.