“Again, therefore,” said I, “if you should ask me, my friends, ‘Why in the world do you speak so much and so frequently about this,’ ‘Pardon me,’ I should say. For, in the first place, it is not easy to prove what this is which you call being overcome by pleasures; and, in the next place, the whole proof depends on this. But even now you are at liberty to retract, if you are able to say that good is any thing else than pleasure, or evil any thing else than pain; or is it enough for you to pass your life pleasantly without pain? If it is enough, and you cannot mention any thing else that is good or evil, which does not end in these, hear what follows: 110. for I say to you, that if this be the case, the assertion is ridiculous, when you say that frequently, a man who knows that evil things are evil, nevertheless does them, when it is in his power not to do them, in consequence of being led away and overpowered by pleasures; and again, when you say that a man who knows what is good, is not willing to do it in consequence of immediate pleasures, by which he is overcome. For it will be manifest that these things are ridiculous, if we do not make use of many names, such as pleasant and painful, good and evil, but, since these things appear to be two, call them also by two names, first, good and evil, next, pleasant and painful. Having settled this, let us say, that a man knowing evil to be evil, nevertheless does it. If, then, any one should ask us, ‘why?’ we shall answer, ‘because he is overcome.’ ‘By what?’ he will ask us. But we are no longer at liberty to say, ‘by pleasure;’ for it has assumed another name instead of pleasure, namely, good. We must, however, answer him, and say, ‘because he is overcome.’ ‘By what?’ he will ask. ‘By good,’ we shall answer, by Jupiter. 111. Now if he who questions should happen to be somewhat insolent, he will laugh at us and say, ‘A ridiculous thing is this you mention, if a man does evil, knowing that it is evil, when he ought not to do it, because he is overcome by good.’ ‘Is it,’ he will ask, ‘because the good is not worthy to overcome the evil in you, or because it is worthy?’ We shall clearly say in answer, that it is because it is not worthy; for otherwise he would not err whom we say is overcome by pleasures. But perhaps he will ask, ‘in what respect are good things unworthy to overcome the evil, or evil to overcome the good? Is it in any other respect than that the one is greater and the other less? or that the one is more, and the other fewer in number?’ We shall not be able to say any thing else than this. ‘It is clear then,’ he will say, ‘that by being overcome you mean to receive greater evil instead of less good.’ And thus much for this part of the question.